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CAN(NOT) A STATE LAW OVERRIDE A FEDERAL TREATY OBLIGATION? 
By 
Evangelo M. Theodosopoulos∗ 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Arbitration contracts between United States’ parties and foreign parties 
face uncertainty from state insurance laws containing anti-arbitration provisions. 
Though courts have done well to respect parties’ decisions to arbitrate, the same 
courts have struggled to respect parties’ decisions to arbitrate insurance disputes. 
Until recently, the law was settled that such arbitration agreements relating to 
contracts of insurance were ultimately subject to state law above all else.1  
 The United States’ Congress expressly granted the fifty states’ preeminent 
authority to regulate the insurance industry under the McCarran Ferguson Act.2  
States have used this authority to enact laws that forbid parties to arbitrate 
insurance related disputes.3 Problems arise when one of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement, which is now rendered void by state law, is an international 
party. International parties are left wondering why the American courts’ 
                                                 
∗ Evangelo M. Theodosopoulos is a 2011 J.D. Candidate at the Pennsylvania State 
University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995). 
2 McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (focusing on the preemption provision 
in § 1012(a); (b)). The McCarran Ferguson Act was Congress’ response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn.,322 U.S. 533 (1944) 
where the Supreme Court held that insurance was interstate commerce and therefore not 
subject to regulation by states. Congress felt that insurance regulation was traditionally 
within the realm of state’s responsibility and therefore the purpose of the McCarran 
Ferguson Act was to turn back the power of insurance regulation to the states as it belonged 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n..    
3 Survey of state statutes prohibiting arbitration of insurance related disputes: (1) Arkansas, 
ACA 16-108-20.  (2) Hawaii, HRS 431:10 -221.  (3) Kansas, KSA 5-401 (not affecting 
arbitration for reinsurance contracts).  (4) Kentucky, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 304.22-101(6).  (5) 
Louisiana, LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 22:629.  (6) Missouri, V.A.M.S. 435.350; 20 Mo. Code 
of State Regulations 500-1.600.  (7)  Nebraska, Neb. Rev. St. 25-2602.01.  (8)  Oklahoma, 
12 Okl. St. § 1855(D).  (9) South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. 15-48-10(b)(4). (10)  South 
Dakota, SDCL 21-25A-3.  (11)  Washington, RCWA 48.18.200.  (12)  Virginia, Va. Code. 
Ann. 38.2-312.       
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responsibility to compel arbitration under the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards4 (hereinafter “New York 
Convention”) fall victim to contrary state laws. To complicate matters, foreign 
insurers play a significant role in the American insurance industry, and arbitration 
is a preferred method of dispute resolution for international parties.5   
 In Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London6, (hereinafter “Safety National”) the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
McCarran Ferguson Act did not allow state law to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement falling under the New York Convention.7 The outcome was both a 
victory and a loss. Under the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, foreign insurers doing 
business with American parties can rest assured that American courts will compel 
arbitration when faced with a valid arbitration agreement, despite the McCarran 
Ferguson Act and state laws to the contrary.8 The problem is that the Fifth Circuit 
was not the first United States’ Circuit court to speak to this issue as the Second 
Circuit had already decided the opposite.9 
 The Supreme Court denied cert to resolve the split between the Second and 
Fifth Circuit, after inviting the Solicitor General of the United States to file a brief 
                                                 
4  United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards Art. 2, September 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.  
5 Arthur D. Postal, Foreign, Domestic Insurers Square Off in Offshore Tax Testimony, 
National Underwriters Online, July 17, 2010, available at http://www.property-
casualty.com/News/2010/7/Pages/Foreign-Domestic-Insurers-Square-.aspx; John P. Dearie 
& Michael Griffin, Overseas Insurers, Risk Management Magazine, Vol 56. Feb. 1, 2009,  
available  at 
http://www.rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Section=MagArchive&NavMenuID=304&tem
plate=/Magazine/DisplayMagazines.cfm&Archive=1&IssueID=332&AID=3835&Volume
=56&ShowArticle=1.   
6 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th 
Cir. 2009). 
7 Id. at 732. 
8 Id. 
9 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995). 
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expressing the views of the United States.10 The Fifth Circuit and Second Circuit 
opinions cannot be reconciled easily. There is little ground for consensus between 
the two opinions. Until the Supreme Court speaks on this issue, practitioners must 
be aware that the Fifth Circuit will uphold international arbitration agreements 
despite state insurance regulations to the contrary, so long as the New York 
Convention would validate the arbitration agreement. 
 
II.  CASE LAW 
 
A. Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London11  (En Banc) 
 
 The Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen, Self Insurer’s Fund 
(hereinafter “LSAT”) is a self insurance fund in Louisiana providing workers’ 
compensation insurance for its members.12 LSAT purchased excess insurance 
coverage from Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London (hereinafter “Lloyd’s”) 
for claims sounding in occupational-injury occurrences that exceeded amounts in 
LSAT accounts.13 Each reinsurance agreement LSAT purchased from Lloyd’s 
contained an arbitration contract.14 After LSAT purchased reinsurance coverage 
from Lloyd’s, LSAT negotiated a Loss Portfolio Transfer agreement with Safety 
National Casualty Corporation (hereinafter “respondent”) whereby LSAT assigned 
its rights under the agreements with Lloyd’s to respondent.15 Lloyd’s refused to 
honor LSAT’s agreement with respondent.16  
                                                 
10 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2010 LEXIS 6262 (Cert. denied); see also, Safety Nat’l 
Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 130 S. Ct. 3311 (inviting Solicitor 
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States). 
11 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009). 
12 Id. at 717. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. 
16 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d 714. 
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 Respondent brought suit in federal district court against Lloyd’s to recover 
rights from the reinsurance agreements gained from the Loss Portfolio Transfer 
Agreement negotiated between respondent and LSAT.17 Lloyd’s moved to compel 
arbitration, and LSAT contended that the arbitration agreements were 
unenforceable under Louisiana Law.18 The district court quashed Lloyd’s motion 
to compel arbitration, noting that the New York Convention19 normally requires 
the court to compel arbitration but in this case a Louisiana Statute20 that prohibits 
arbitration agreements in insurance contracts required the Court to disregard the 
New York Convention.21 The district court reasoned that the New York 
Convention was reverse-preempted by State law because of the McCarran 
Ferguson Act.22 The Louisiana district court subsequently certified the order 
containing its rulings for immediate appeal because its ruling involved a question 
of law to which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).23 A panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that the McCarran 
Ferguson Act did not allow the Louisiana anti-arbitration provision to ‘reverse 
preempt’ the New York Convention or the New York Convention’s Implementing 
legislation.24 The Fifth Circuit granted Rehearing en banc, and the panel opinion 
was vacated.25 In its En Banc opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that the state law does 
not reverse-preempt the New York Convention.26 
 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by looking to the texts of the relevant 
statutes and treaties: The Louisiana statute,27 the New York Convention, Section 2 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 718.  
19 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
20 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868. 
21 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 718. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 718 (discussing the holding of the lower court in the context of the treaty itself, and 
the treaty’s implementing legislation.). 
25  Id.  
26  Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 718. 
27 Id.  at 718 (referring to LA. Rev. Stat. Ann § 22:868). 
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of the Federal Arbitration Act (the New York Convention’s implementing 
legislation),28 and the McCarran Ferguson Act.29 The relevant portion of the 
Louisiana statute30 that LSAT cited to deny Lloyd’s motion to compel arbitration 
provides: 
 
A. No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in 
this state and covering subjects located, resident or to be 
performed in this state… shall contain any condition, 
stipulation, or agreement:… 
(2) Depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of 
action against the insurer.  
(C) Any such condition, stipulation, or agreement in 
violation of this Section shall be void, but such voiding shall 
not affect the validity of the other provisions of the contract.  
 
The Court noted that Louisiana courts voided arbitration agreements on the basis 
of this statute, although it is not clear from the text of the statute that arbitration 
agreements were unenforceable.31 Next, the court concluded that the Louisiana 
Statute conflicted with the United States commitments under the New York 
Convention.32 The relevant portion of the New York Convention provides: 
 
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in 
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to 
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or may 
                                                 
28 Id.  at 718 (referring to the New York Convention’s implementing legislation, Chapter 2 
of the Federal Arbitration Act). 
29 Id.  at 718 (referring to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (focusing on the preemption provision in 
§ 1012(a);(b))). 
30 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868. 
31 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 719. 
32 Id.  
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arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, concerning subject matter 
capable of settlement by arbitration… 
3. The Court of a Contract State, when seized of an action in 
a matter in respect of which the parties have made an 
agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the 
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, 
unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.33 
 
In looking to the text of the New York Convention, the court determined that the 
treaty contemplates enforcement of agreements under the convention in the 
signatory nation’s courts.34 The court next looked to the text the treaty’s 
implementing legislation and noted that the implementing legislation establishes 
both federal court jurisdiction and venue.35 
 The Court also considered the text of the McCarran Ferguson Act. The 
relevant portion of the statute provides that “No act of Congress shall be construed 
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance... unless such act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance.” Neither party argued that the New York Convention and its 
implementing legislation specifically related to the business of insurance.36  It was 
assumed that the Louisiana statute regulates the business of insurance because 
neither party made it an issue.37 The focus of the Court’s discussion was centered 
on whether the Louisiana statute overrode the New York Convention’s 
                                                 
33 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: 
Art. II pp. 1, 3. 
34 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 719.  
35 Id. (citing the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 203-4.). 
36 Id. at 720-721. 
37 Id. at 721. 
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requirement that the parties’ dispute be submitted to arbitration because the Court 
construes an act of Congress to invalidate, impair, or supersede state law.38   
 LSAT argued that the New York Convention was not a self executing 
treaty and that the New York Convention only had effect in United States courts 
because the United States Congress passed implementing legislation.39 According 
to LSAT, the Court must look to the implementing legislation and the McCarran 
Ferguson Act requires the Court to construe the New York Convention’s 
implementing legislation as reverse preempted by Louisiana’s Anti-arbitration 
statute.40 In considering LSAT’s argument The Court first discussed the 
importance of whether the New York Convention was self-executing or not in 
more detail.  
 LSAT conceded to the Court that, if the New York Convention were self-
executing “it would be a treaty and not an ‘Act of Congress’ within the meaning of 
the McCarran Ferguson Act.”41 Nevertheless, Lloyd’s did not argue that the New 
York Convention was self executing.42 The Court proceeded to discuss, however, 
the test for determining whether a treaty is self executing, referencing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas.43 Applying the Court’s reasoning in 
Medillin, paying close attention to the Court’s dicta,44 the Fifth Circuit only said 
that the Supreme Court’s language and decision in Medillin did not foreclose the 
possibility that the New York Convention is partially self-executing.45 The Fifth 
Circuit, however, did not make such a decision, reasoning instead that “Act of 
                                                 
38 Id.  
39 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 721. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that the Avena judgments of the International Court of 
Justice were not binding on United States courts because the Vienna Convention was not 
self executing).  
44 See id. at 521-522 (citing the New York Convention as an example of Congress 
according domestic effect to international obligations when it desires that result).  
45 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 723. 
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congress,” as used in the McCarran Ferguson Act, was not meant to encompass a 
non-self executing treaty that has been implemented by Congressional 
legislation.46 
 The bottom line for the 5th Circuit is that a treaty remains a treaty, not an 
“Act of Congress,” even if the treaty is implemented by Congressional 
legislation.47 Although the concept is easy to understand, the majority opinion is 
filled with justifications for such a conclusion. Somewhat self-explanatory, the 
majority explains that a treaty remains a treaty and not an “Act of Congress” 
because the treaty is negotiated by the Executive branch and ratified by the senate, 
not Congress.48 The Court thought it untenable that when Congress used the phrase 
“Act of Congress” in the McCarran Ferguson Act, that the Congress intended that 
phrase to exclude self-executing treaties while including treaties implemented by 
Congress.49 Language in the Federal Arbitration Act implementing the New York 
Convention also supports the majority’s distinction that an action within the New 
York Convention arises under the “Laws of the United States” as well as the 
“Treaties of the United States.”50 The Fifth Circuit read Congress’ construction of 
Section 203 to mean that Congress thought that jurisdiction to enforce rights under 
the New York Convention did not “arise solely under an Act of Congress.”51  
 Focusing on the language in the implementing legislation, the Court said 
that it must “construe”52 the convention to be faced with the possibility of 
“superseding,” invalidating, or impairing the Louisiana law because the 
implementing legislation says little more than that it is implementing the treaty.53 
The Court next lists rules articulated in the New York Convention that supersede, 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 723-724.  
50 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724 (looking to Jurisdiction; Amount in 
Controversy, 9 U.S.C. § 203 “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall 
be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States”). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 725 (using “construe” as the term is used in the McCarran Ferguson Act). 
53 Id. 
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invalidate, or impair the function of the Louisiana law.54 The Fifth Circuit 
explained that only by reference to the rules articulated in the convention, an 
implemented treaty, is there a command – “a judicially enforceable remedy” – to 
compel arbitration and impair the function of the Louisiana anti-arbitration 
statute.55 
 The Fifth Circuit majority proceeded to attack the dissent’s position that an 
implemented non-self executing treaty is not a treaty within the meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause56 of the U.S. Constitution.57 The majority explains that the 
dissent’s reliance on Hopson v. Kreps58 for the proposition that an implemented 
treaty has no independent significance is misplaced because the dissent reads 
Hopson out of context.59  According to the majority, the dissent short circuits the 
meaning of Hopson because Hopson stands for the proposition that an 
implemented treaty does not have independent significance in defining the terms of 
its implementing legislation when the treaty and implementing legislation are in 
conflict, not that an implemented treaty has no significance as the dissent suggests. 
The majority also criticizes the dissent’s reliance on a “consensus of legal 
scholars,” explaining that the only source cited by the dissent would support the 
majority’s position.60 
 After attacking the dissent’s position, the majority looks to case law at the 
time that the McCarran Ferguson Act was enacted to see whether courts analyzed 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 725. 
56 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.  
57 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 725. 
58 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that an implemented treaty may aid in 
defining the intended meaning of the terms used in the implementing statute, but the treaty 
does not have independent significance in defining terms used in the implementing statute 
when the treaty and the implementing statute are in conflict). 
59 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 726. 
60 Id. (quoting a passage from Louis Henkin, REPORTER OF RESTATEMENT (3RD) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW). 
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treaties as “Acts of Congress.”61 The majority proffers Missouri v. Holland62 to 
support its position that an implemented treaty is viewed as distinct from the “act 
of congress” that implements the treaty.63 From this 1920 Supreme Court case, the 
majority explains, Congress, in passing the McCarran Ferguson Act two decades 
later, was aware that a treaty that requires implementing legislation is distinct from 
an Act of Congress and the treaty itself could validly “‘override [a state’s] 
power.’”64 It is furthermore unlikely that when Congress crafted the McCarran 
Ferguson Act that Congress intended to abrogate any future treaty implemented by 
an Act of Congress.65 The Majority thinks it is more likely that, should Congress 
have intended for non-self-executing treaties to fall within the purview of the 
McCarran Ferguson Act, that Congress would have included the phrase “or any 
treaty requiring congressional implementation” following the phrase “Act of 
Congress.”66   
 The Majority also found support for its position to compel arbitration in 
the “congressionally sanctioned national policy favoring arbitration of international 
commercial agreements.”67 The majority focused on the Supreme Court’s 
discussion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,68 to 
elaborate the policy aspects supporting the decision to compel arbitration. The 
majority emphasized that International arbitration has become commonplace in an 
economy of expanding international trade, judicial hostility to arbitration must 
lessen, and national courts must cede jurisdiction of claims to transnational 
tribunals to support an international policy favoring commercial arbitration.69 The 
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi subjected national antitrust laws to arbitration 
                                                 
61 Id. at 728. 
62 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
63 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 728.  
64 Id. at 729 (quoting Holland, 252 U.S. at 434). 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 730. 
68 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
69 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 730 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638-39). 
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explaining that all claims implicating statutory rights are subject to arbitration as 
per the national policy favoring arbitration articulated in the Federal Arbitration 
Act, less the “congressional intention expressed in some other statute” identifies a 
series of claims which must be held unenforceable.70 Further, the Court stated that 
the Sherman Act did not evince such intent in Mitsubishi71, and the Majority in 
Safety National did not discern the McCarran Ferguson Act to “include protection 
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum.”72 The majority explains that the 
“strong policy” interests of states in regulating of the business of insurance are 
“ameliorated by the substantive provisions in the Convention,” because “the 
national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage” to ensure that the legitimate interests of states in regulating 
insurance is protected.73  
 
B.  Circuit Split: Fifth Circuit versus the Second Circuit 
 
 The majority in Safety National74 concludes by expressing awareness that 
its decision conflicts with precedent in the Second Circuit.75 In dissecting the 
relevant portion of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Stephens v. American 
International Insurance co.76 the majority explains that the Second Circuit merely 
concluded that the New York Convention did not contain self executing treaty 
provisions, but notes that the Second Circuit did not address the intent of Congress 
                                                 
70 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627). 
71 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627. 
72 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 730. 
73 Id. at 730-731. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 731. 
76 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995) (holding that a Kentucky anti-
arbitration provision regulating the business of insurance reverse preempted the New York 
Convention because the New York Convention is a non-self-executing treaty that gets its 
domestic effect from its implementing legislation, and implementing legislation is an Act 
of Congress). 
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in using the phrase “no Act of Congress” in the McCarran Ferguson Act.77 The 
Fifth Circuit therefore attempts to make self-execution irrelevant to its reasoning, 
in explaining that treaty provisions, self-executing or not, cannot be reverse 
preempted by state law under the McCarran Ferguson Act because no treaty is 
within the reach of the McCarran Ferguson Act.78 Essentially, the Fifth Circuit 
sidesteps the Second Circuit’s finding that the implementing legislation gave the 
New York Convention its legal effect. The Fifth Circuit also notes that a 
subsequent decision, Stephens v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.,79 casts 
doubt on the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Stephens v. American International 
Insurance Co.80 despite the Second Circuit’s carefully navigating its decision 
through alternative reasoning in its subsequent decision.81  
 Judge Edith Brown Clement of the Fifth Circuit was the lone concurrence 
for Safety National, but nevertheless she expands a compelling argument first 
suggested by the majority, and not addressed by the dissent. The Majority does not 
address whether Article II Section 3 of the New York Convention is a self-
executing treaty provision because the majority claims that Lloyd’s did not brief 
the argument for its en banc rehearing.82 Judge Brown Clement explains that 
Lloyd’s should not be punished for focusing their en banc brief to address the 
                                                 
77 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 731 (distinguishing Stephens, 66 F.3d 41). 
78 Id. 
79 69 F.3d 1226 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a New York insurance law did not reverse 
preempt the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because the McCarran Ferguson Act does 
not allow state law to reverse preempt the common law, and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act operated by common law before Congress codified the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act with an Act of Congress). 
80 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995).  
81 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 732 (quoting the Second Circuit in n.6 of Stephens 
v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 69 F.3d at 1233, where the Court explained that 
another panel ruled that the McCarran Ferguson Act prohibited the application of the 
Federal Arbitration Act in a way that preempted Kentucky insurance law, but this panel did 
not have to consider whether its holding conflicted with the other panel because this panel 
may rest its opinion on the ground that the Federal Statute at issue passed before the 
McCarran Ferguson Act and was well supported in Common Law before it was codified in 
statute).  
82 Id. at 732 n.1 (Clement, J., concurring). 
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question posed by the panel.83 According to Judge Brown Clement Article II, 
Section 3, of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision.84 The 
idea of a self-executing treaty provision comes from the Supreme Court’s language 
in Medellin.85 A treaty’s parts may be separated from the whole of the treaty in 
order to evaluate whether a part of the treaty is self-executing.86 Applying 
Medellin, Judge Brown Clement analyzes the language in Article II and concludes 
that Article II of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision 
because it provides a “directive to domestic courts” when it uses mandatory 
language requiring courts to refer parties to arbitration.87 The Concurrence 
appropriately deals with unfavorable dicta in Medellin88 where the Supreme Court 
suggests that the Congress knows how to give domestic effect to a treaty when it 
has to do so, using the implementing legislation of the New York Convention as an 
example.89 Starting from the idea that a treaty provision, not the whole treaty, is the 
appropriate unit of analysis in determining self-executing status, Judge Brown 
Clement limits the effective application of the Supreme Court’s dicta in Medellin. 
Judge Brown Clement explains that the Supreme Court was not referring to Article 
II, Section 3, in its example of a non-self-executing treaty provision and therefore 
Medellin’s dicta did not imply that the Convention is “non-self-executing in all 
respects.”90 Recognizing that multilateral treaties are “presumptively non-self-
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 732-733. 
85 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (noting its “obligation to interpret treaty provisions 
to determine whether they are self-executing”). 
86 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 734 (Clement, J., concurring) (“Although the 
Supreme Court has never expressly held that individual treaty provisions may be self-
executing, while a treaty in its entirety may not be, its case law inescapably leads to this 
conclusion”). 
87 Id. at 735 (Clement, J., concurring) (quoting language from Medillin). 
88 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
89 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521-522. 
90 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 736 (Clement, J., concurring). 
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executing,” Judge Brown Clement nevertheless concludes that Article II Section 3 
of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision.91 
 Three judges dissented from the majority opinion of the en banc panel in 
Safety National. The dissent begins by stating its argument in plain terms, 
implementing legislation is an “Act of Congress” and because the implementing 
legislation of the New York Convention does not explicitly address insurance, it is 
not capable of preempting state law.92 The dissent contends that there is no 
precedent to suggest that a non-self-executing treaty, in and of itself, has the power 
to preempt state law.93 The source of preemptive authority for a non-self-executing 
treaty is its implementing legislation.94 The dissent points to a string of authority 
for the proposition that non-self-executing treaties can only be enforced pursuant 
to legislation to carry them into effect.95 The dissent explains that these treaties, 
requiring implementing legislation, have equal standing with federal statutes.96 
After responding to every argument forwarded by the majority, the dissent 
concludes that the holding of the Second Circuit should control the outcome of this 
case.97 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Navigating the Circuit Split 
 
 The majority in Safety National (en banc) composes a lengthy opinion 
with many arguments forwarded to support its conclusion, but a small three-judge 
                                                 
91 Id. at 737. (Clement, J., concurring).  
92 Id. (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 738. (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
95 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 738 (Elrod, dissenting) (citing Foster v. Neilson¸ 7 
L. Ed. 415 (1829), Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), and Medellin, 552 U.S. 491 
(2008)). 
96 Id. at 737 (Elrod, J., dissenting) (citing Edye v. Robertson (Head-Money Cases), 112 
U.S. 580 (1884)).   
97 Id. at 751 (Elrod, J., dissenting).  
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dissent drafts an opinion equal to the majority in its persuasive appeal. The Second 
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have now addressed the same issue and provided 
diametrically opposed opinions. The Fifth Circuit majority attempts to distinguish 
the Second Circuit’s opinion,98 but the effectiveness of such an attempt will be 
judged by the lower courts in navigating through the case law.   
 The majority ultimately forwards three main arguments in support of its 
conclusion (1) A treaty and the act of Congress that implements the treaty cannot 
be merely an “Act of Congress”99 (2) Implemented, non-self-executing treaties are 
not “Acts of Congress” as that phrase is used in the McCarran Ferguson Act,100 and 
(3) America’s strong national policy favoring the decision to compel arbitration in 
international commercial agreements bolster’s the majority’s conclusion.101 The 
dissent argues that (1) only the Implementing legislation of a non-self-executing 
treaty is capable of preempting state law,102 (2) a non-self-executing treaty has no 
independent significance apart from its implementing legislation,103 and (3) a non-
self-executing treaty’s implementing legislation is on par with a federal statute 
subject to reverse preemption under the McCarran Ferguson Act.104 
 Borrowing the novel approach forwarded by the Safety National 
concurrence may be the safest way to reconcile the Fifth Circuit with the Second 
Circuit. The Second Circuit’s reasoning can be distinguished on the basis that the 
Supreme Court articulated a new framework for determining self-executing treaty 
status in Medellin,105 thirteen years after Stephens106 was decided. Stephens holding 
                                                 
98 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
99 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 722-23. 
100 Id. at 723-25, 728. 
101 Id. at 730-31. 
102 Id. at 738-40 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 740 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
104 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 740 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
105 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-507 (2008) (outlining the framework for 
determining the self-execution status of treaties, “the interpretation of a treaty, like the 
interpretation of a statute, begins with its text… we have also considered ‘aids to 
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relies on the finding that the New York Convention is a non-self-executing treaty. 
Also, the Second Circuit’s analysis in Stephens is less than thorough on this 
point.107 Applying the newer, binding framework for determining self-executing 
treaty status articulated in Medellin, and then reaching the conclusion that Article 
II, Section 3, of the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty provision is a 
sufficient ground for distinguishing the result in Stephens without sidestepping the 
result in Stephens.     
   
B.  The Aftermath: Pick a Side 
 
 Since Safety National (en banc) was decided by the Fifth Circuit, the other 
federal circuits and state courts alike have abstained from the debate over whether 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act authorizes states’ laws to preempt international 
arbitration agreements falling under the New York Convention.  The Fifth Circuit 
since clarified its position on the McCarran-Ferguson Act in the context of 
arbitration, explaining “We have held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows state 
regulation of insurance to preempt the FAA (Internal citations omitted). However, 
even more recently we have held that state insurance law cannot reverse preempt 
the New York Convention and its implementing legislation (Internal citation 
omitted).”108   
 Academics have sided with the Fifth Circuit. The Restatement (Third) of 
International Commercial Arbitration takes the position that the McCarran 
Ferguson Act does not restrict arbitral tribunals of their jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                            
interpretation’ the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as the 
‘postratification understanding’ of signatory nations”). 
106 Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 1995). 
107 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 737 (Clement, concurring) (identifying a lack of 
analysis in Stephens, 66 F.3d 41 on the point that the New York Convention is not self-
executing.). 
108 Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329, 335 fn.9 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
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international transactions arising under Chapter Two of the FAA.109 Similarly, 
Couch on Insurance takes the position that Congress, in drafting the McCarran 
Ferguson Act, did not intend to include “treaty” within the scope of the words “act 
of congress,” such that an international agreement among nations would be subject 
to reverse preemption.110 Thus far, the Fifth Circuit got it right.   
 Circuit Judge Cohen’s Concurring opinion in Safety National111 has 
influenced at least one other Judge’s approach to analyzing multilateral treaties 
status’ as self-executing or not.112 Judge Torreula forcefully argues against the 
judicial presumption that multilateral treaties are non-self-executing without first 
looking to the text of the treaty.113 Circuit Judge Torruela forcefully argues that 
should judges not begin with the text of a treaty when considering the doctrine of 
self-execution as instructed by the Supreme Court, the “judicially created theory” 
of self-execution will continue to erode our nation’s international commitments.114 
         
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The circuit split between the Fifth and Second Circuits may stir 
uncertainty for international parties looking to do business in the American 
insurance industry. Though the Second Circuit’s opinion left the integrity of 
                                                 
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §5-13 (Reporter’s 
Notes). 
110 COUCH ON INSURANCE (THIRD) §2:4. 
111 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 737 (Clement, J., concurring). 
112 Iguarta v. U.S., 626 F.3d 592, 621 (1st Cir. 2010) (Torruela, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
113 Id. at 621-22 (citing Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d d at 737 (Clement, J., 
concurring)). 
114 See id. (Torruela, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The doctrine of self-
execution of treaties, or stated in the negative, of non-self-execution, is a judicially-created 
theory which has, at convenient times, been used to avoid international commitments, 
particularly where human rights are concerned. Today, this theory promotes a rule whereby 
treaties are presumed to be non-self-executing, when in fact the text and history of the 
Supremacy Clause counsel exactly the opposite”). 
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international commercial arbitration agreements subject to the application of fifty 
varying bodies of insurance regulation, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari 
leaves parties searching for ways to square the opinions of the Fifth and Second 
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit majority suggests grounds to distinguish the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion, even when the Second Circuit looked at the same components 
(New York Convention, state insurance regulation, and the McCarran Ferguson 
Act) to reach its conclusion. Furthermore the dissent in Safety National makes 
strong arguments casting doubt on the majority’s analysis of self-executing and 
non-self-executing treaties. The effect of Safety National is that all treaties, self-
executing or not, are no longer within the reach of the McCarran Ferguson Act. 
Practitioners representing international parties should be aware of the way that 
state jurisdictions have interpreted anti-arbitration provisions when drafting their 
arbitration agreements. The safest way to ensure that an arbitration agreement is 
enforced is to survey the laws of the controlling state and check for anti-arbitration 
provisions or jurisdiction stripping language in the context of insurance.115 While 
the Fifth Circuit opinion was a victory for predictability in the field of international 
commercial arbitration, comparatively, the Supreme Court’s silence on the split 
between the Second and the Fifth Circuit may further complicate matters for 
international parties in the insurance industry. Practitioners, be weary!        
                                                 
115 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
